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O ver the course of the nineteenth century, the United States experienced its first “industrial revolution.” A central feature of this revolution was the mechanization of production, first through water power and later steam 
power. By the late nineteenth century, the process was well advanced, fostering 
serious concerns about its effects on labor (Giedion 1948; Hounshell 1984). For 
example, David A. Wells (1889, p. 68), a prominent US economist of the time, wrote 
that “the increasing frequency of strikes and industrial revolts ... have been largely 
prompted by changes in the conditions of production resulting from prior labor-
saving inventions and discoveries” and he opined “the depression of industry in 
recent years has been experienced with greatest severity in those countries where 
machinery has been most extensively adopted.” Indeed, the historical process was 
so disruptive that it inspired Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward, 2000–1887 (1888), 
a utopian science fiction novel, which quickly became the era’s third-largest best-
seller and provoked extensive political and social discussion.
In the first annual report to Congress, Commissioner of Labor Carroll D. 
Wright (US Bureau of Labor 1886) drew attention to the problem of the “tempo-
rary displacement of labor and to conditions of industry and of society which would 
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exist without the presence of power machinery,” illustrating with several examples. 
In small arms production, one worker using conventional hand tools turned and 
fitted one musket stock per ten-hour day, whereas using specialized machines and 
dividing the tasks between them, three workers could turn and fit between 125 and 
150 musket stocks per day, a 40- to 50-fold gain in labor productivity. Similarly, data 
from boot and shoe manufacturers suggested an 80 percent savings in labor for 
machine over handicraft production (US Bureau of Labor 1886, p. 81).
In 1894, Congress requested a fuller investigation, noting “there are works 
now in existence where the very best and highest grade of machinery is used that 
formerly employed cruder methods, and the men in charge have knowledge of the 
old methods as compared with the new; but these men are fast passing away, and the 
difficulty increases each year of securing the information sought …” (US Congress, 
House of Representatives 1894). To this end, it directed the Commissioner of Labor 
to “investigate and report upon the effect of the use of machinery upon labor and 
the cost of production, the relative productive power of hand and machine labor … 
and whether changes in the creative cost of products are due to a lack or surplus of 
labor or to the introduction of power machinery.” 
The resulting “Hand and Machine Labor” (HML) study took five years to 
complete, finally appearing as the thirteenth annual report of the Commissioner 
of Labor (US Department of Labor 1899). 1 The HML study presents its informa-
tion at a level of detail that was highly unusual not only for its time but even ours, 
by analyzing the production of highly specific goods (for example, production of 
circular saw blades with a given number of teeth) at the task level for a matched pair 
of establishments, one of which produced the product by “hand” (or traditional 
artisanal) methods and the other using “machine” methods. Among other data, 
the report specifies the amount of time each task took, the sequence in which these 
were performed, the characteristics of the workers employed, the tool(s) used, 
and notably, the source of inanimate power, if any, including steam power, which 
was the key “general-purpose technology” of that historical period. Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee (2014, p. 6), for example, describe steam power as the first machine 
age’s “most important” technological development, “overcoming the limitations of 
1  The US Bureau of Labor was established in the Department of the Interior by the Bureau of Labor 
Act (23 Stat. 60) on June 27, 1884. The Bureau’s mission was to collect information about employment 
and labor. The Act also created the post of US Commissioner of Labor to direct the Bureau. Carroll 
Wright served as the first US Commissioner of Labor. The Bureau of Labor became an independent 
(sub-Cabinet) department through the Department of Labor Act (25 Stat. 182) on June 13, 1888. As 
indicated by the title of the legislation, the Bureau of Labor was renamed the “US Department of Labor” 
in 1888. The cabinet-level Department of Commerce and Labor was created in 1903 by the Department 
of Commerce Act (32 Stat. 827) on February 14, 1903. The Act authorized a new “Bureau of Labor” 
within the Department of Commerce and Labor, which took over the activities of the preceding “Depart-
ment of Labor.” Finally, in 1913, Congress created a separate cabinet-level Department of Labor, within 
which the “Bureau of Labor” was renamed the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As is clear from this timeline, 
the 1890s “Department of Labor” is a direct predecessor of the modern Bureau of Labor Statistics, which 
is why the National Archives stores the extant records of the 1890s department in its Record Group 
257 (“Records of the Bureau of Labor Statistics”). The timeline above expands on Rockoff’s (2019, 
pp.147–51) discussion.
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muscle power, human and animal” and propelling a “sudden, sharp, and sustained 
jump in human progress.” 
The enormously complex Hand and Machine Labor data were published in 
two large, very dense volumes. We have digitized these data, coding and restruc-
turing them to be tractable to modern econometric techniques. Our analysis here 
focuses on transitions at the task level from hand to machine production, and on 
the impact of inanimate power on labor productivity in machine production. 
By “transitions at the task level” we mean whether particular tasks in hand 
production were no longer present under machine production; whether the task 
content remained the same, even if inanimate power was used under machine 
production; whether task reorganization occurred in the move from hand to 
machine labor; or whether entirely new tasks were present under machine labor. 
Transitions in which the task content remained the same except for the possibility 
of mechanization—we call these 1:1 transitions—were the most common. However, 
highly complex task reorganization did occur, and new task creation substantially 
dominated the abandonment of obsolete hand tasks. Overall, the transition to 
machine labor brought very large gains in productivity. We show in a regression 
analysis of the 1:1 transitions that use of steam power explains a large fraction of the 
productivity gain. Economic historians have been studying the diffusion and impact 
of steam power for a very long time; but as far as we know, our regressions are the 
first to show the productivity effects of steam power at the level of individual produc-
tion tasks in an historical context.
We consider the Hand and Machine Labor data and our findings in the 
context of the modern “task-based approach” to production (Acemoglu and Autor 
2011; Autor 2013; Zeira 1998). This literature develops models allowing technolog-
ical change to reduce returns to specific factors, which is not possible in standard 
models of factor-augmenting technological change. We will focus in particular 
on Acemoglu and Restrepo’s (2018) recent model of automation (also discussed 
in their paper for this symposium). Their model is quite useful in drawing out 
inferences as to how, in response to technical progress, some tasks are abandoned; 
others automated, and new, non-automated tasks created. Substituting “mecha-
nized” for “automated” in their framework, we find a similar pattern in the data 
from the HML study. However, we will also argue that our historical example 
clearly parts company with Acemoglu and Restrepo in that their model abstracts 
from the division of labor. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the diffu-
sion of steam power enhanced the division of labor (Atack, Bateman, and Margo 
2008), as Thomson (1989) also shows in the transformation of US boot and shoe 
production during this time. The underlying issue is the degree to which workers 
are specialized or not in the tasks they perform, and how this may feed back into 
human capital investment. Indeed, we will suggest that one of the meaningful 
differences between nineteenth-century mechanization and the current techno-
logical revolution based in robotics and artificial intelligence is that they seem 
to have quite different implications for the division of labor and thus for human 
capital investment. 
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The Hand and Machine Labor Study
Although the title of the 1899 study was “Hand and Machine Labor,” Commis-
sioner of Labor Wright cautioned in his introductory remarks that the words were 
not used in their strictest sense, but rather to characterize two different methods 
of production. “Machines” were used in “hand” production although these were 
usually simple hand tools—saws, hammers, chisels, files, knitting needles, screw-
drivers, and the like—what he called “the primitive method of production which was 
in vogue before the general use of automatic or power machines” (US Department 
of Labor 1899, vol. 1, p. 11). Similarly, some tasks in machine production continued 
to be performed by hand using these same simple tools, including adjusting the 
machinery. For Wright, however, a crucial distinction was that, in machine produc-
tion, “every workman has his particular work to perform, generally but a very small 
portion of that which goes to the completion of the article”—that is, division of 
labor was central (p. 11). 
The basic unit of observation in the Hand and Machine Labor study was a 
matched pair of production units: one using hand methods, the other using 
machine methods to make a particular quantity of product. The products chosen 
were highly specific—for example, the output of “Unit 71” was described in the 
report as “SHOES:—100 pairs of men’s medium grade, calf, welt, lace shoes, with 
single soles and soft box toes” (US Department of Labor 1899). Where necessary, 
production was scaled to industry norms by adjusting the time (and thus the cost) 
spent on tasks by the appropriate factor, keeping the number of workers unchanged 
(as we will explain further below). Overall, there are 672 paired units in the HML 
study: 27 in agriculture, 10 in mining and quarrying, and 9 in transportation, leaving 
626 paired units producing manufactures. We focus on these manufactures. 
As mentioned, the data were reported in two parts (and volumes). In Part 1, 
the following was reported for each unit (matched pair of plants producing a highly 
specific product): an industry classification, an exact description of the product, the 
standardized quantity of that product, the year in which the production under each 
method took place, the number of separate tasks of production, the number of 
different workers employed, and the total number of hours of work to produce the 
given quantity, the total labor costs, and the average daily hours of operation of the 
unit. In Part 2, the following information was reported for each mode of producing 
the product: a brief description of the task in the order in which it was performed; 
a list of capital goods or machines used in the task; the type of motive power if 
used; the number of workers assigned to that task; the number, age, gender, and 
occupational titles of the workers employed in the task; the hours of work by each 
employee engaged in the task; and the labor cost of each employee engaged in the 
task along with any miscellaneous comments.
The raw data were collected by trained agents either through direct observa-
tion or from written records, following up (sometimes repeatedly) when necessary to 
resolve inconsistencies and ambiguities. For machine production, the vast majority of 
the observations pertain to activities conducted in the mid-to-late 1890s (1894–98). 
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For a few products, the study was unable to find matching hand production from 
the same year that occurred nearby, presumably because the relevant establishments 
were no longer in existence. In such cases, the agents assiduously sought out histor-
ical records or, in 13 instances, located hand production establishments overseas 
that they deemed similar to those that no longer survived in the United States. All 
machine production data, however, was taken from US establishments. Moreover, 
in the majority of cases, two reports on hand and machine production were secured 
for establishments/manufacturers from different, widely separated, localities to help 
spot errors and omissions with “the better and more complete one then selected for 
presentation” (US Department of Labor 1899, vol. 1, p. 13).
A concrete example illustrates the exceptional (indeed, stupefying) detail in 
the published study. In making men’s medium grade, laced shoes (Unit 71), the 
study compared production by a bespoke shoemaker producing a single pair of 
shoes with that of a factory producing 1,500 pairs, scaling the time (and cost) as 
if each in fact produced 100 pairs of shoes. 2 The shoe size is not specified but is 
(implicitly) assumed to be different for each pair. The data were tabulated, verso 
and recto, across several pages, with task identifiers aligning the rows across the left- 
and right-hand pages and with the numbering sequenced according to the order in 
which the tasks were performed in machine production. 
Hand production of medium grade, laced shoes involved 72 tasks. Selecting 
and sorting the leather was one task in hand production—presumably so that the 
uppers for one pair of shoes could come from the same hide—compared with eight 
separate operations in machine production, for uppers, vamps, quarters, outsoles, 
insoles, lifts, and counters (machine-molded heel reinforcements), all of which had 
to be both sorted and matched. In hand production, the individual shoemaker traced 
each foot to create a cutting pattern and subsequently hand-carved a “last” (a wooden 
form around which each shoe was molded). These steps were crucial for the fit of the 
shoe and would be repeated for each individual customer served by the shoemaker. 
Producing lasts by hand was time-consuming, taking 54 minutes 24 seconds per pair—
almost 92 hours for the production run of 100 different pairs of shoes. By contrast, 
under machine production, the factory skipped these steps, instead purchasing lathe-
turned lasts for left and right feet in standard sizes from outside specialist suppliers, 
which would be used in the fabrication of thousands of pairs of shoes—an example 
of the subsidiary industries predicted to emerge to meet special needs once a certain 
scale of operation was achieved (Marshall and Marshall 1881, p. 52). 
In the machine production of these shoes, the Hand and Machine Labor study 
identified 173 separate tasks. These include not only tasks directly related to the 
manufacture of shoes, like sorting leather, cutting out the vamps (the main part of the 
shoe between the toe and the laces), quarters (the heel portions), toes, soles, insoles, 
2 Exhibits 1 and 2 in the online Appendix available with this paper at the journal’s website reproduce 
sections of the tables for Unit 71 detailing the tasks in the hand and machine production of men’s 
medium grade, laced shoes from the Hand and Machine Labor report (US Department of Labor 
1899).
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and heels and sewing these together around the last to form the shoe and punching 
holes for the laces. Tasks also included finishing the shoes for market by smoothing 
the welts, waxing and polishing, matching pairs, stamping with the maker’s name 
and size, and boxing for shipment. Moreover, other tasks involved keeping the shoe-
making machinery in good order, and maintaining and firing the steam engine that 
powered the various machines—tasks not directly involved with production but vital 
to that production. Some of the tasks, like sorting, required nothing more than a good 
eye. Others, like cutting out the parts, still used basic hand tools (scissors and knives) 
rather than steam-powered die presses. Eighty of the tasks, however, including trim-
ming, making eyelets, nailing heels, polishing and buffing, made use of steam power 
driving specialized machines (US Department of Labor 1899, vol. 2, pp. 544–51).
The study investigators carefully linked each operation in hand production to 
the corresponding operation in machine production via the machine task number. 
Machine tasks that were a part of several hand tasks had lowercase letters appended 
to the machine task number. The data showing the connections from hand tasks to 
machine tasks can be displayed as a “slope chart”3 relating each of the various hand 
tasks for shoe-making on the left to the (far more numerous) machine tasks for 
shoe-making on the right, as in Figure 1. Tasks are numbered in sequence.
Some hand tasks link to multiple machine tasks. Some are performed in quite 
different sequences between hand and machine production—these lines cross over. 
A few hand tasks like “selecting and sorting stock” vanish in machine production (we 
have connected these to “Task 0” in Machine Production on the right hand side). 
Moreover, the white space on the right-hand axis to which no hand production tasks 
connect represent new tasks created by mechanization for which there was no hand 
production analog. In the next section, we discuss these task “transitions.”
The complexity of the Hand and Machine Labor data overwhelmed statisti-
cians at the time. As Carroll Wright (1900) would later remark: “This report answers 
in a measure the many demands for information … but no aggregation can be 
made because it is impossible to carry out calculations through the innumerable 
ramifications of production under hand and machine methods … although such 
a summary would be of the greatest possible value in the study of the question of 
machinery.” Its complexity has also largely prevented analysis by modern economic 
historians until very recently.4 
Before turning to our findings, we highlight four limitations of the Hand 
and Machine Labor data. First, although a wide range of goods and industries are 
covered, the establishments that were included are in no sense a random sample 
either within or across industries. Second, no information was collected on output 
prices, revenues, or costs, except those pertaining to the labor involved directly in 
3 For more on slope charts, see Tufte (1983, p. 143), or https://www.edwardtufte.com/bboard/ 
q-and-a-fetch-msg?msg_id=0003nk. 
4 Stanley Engerman has informed us (via personal communication) that he and Robert Fogel included the 
Hand and Machine Labor study on an unpublished list of key data sources in US economic history that 
the two prepared in the early 1970s. However, in their view the data were far too complex to digitize and 
analyze at that time, which was a reasonable judgment until recent advances in information technologies.
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the production of the product (and its supervision). Consequently, any analysis of 
productivity, including ours, must rely on the measure provided by the study—the 
amount of time that it took to complete a task—rather than a measure that would 
be more conventional for economists like value added per worker. Third, while the 
agents recorded additional information on the survey form that would have been 
very useful to have for some analyses—for example, the names of the individual 
workers, and the address of the establishment—this information was not included 
in the published study. Moreover, as far as we can determine, the completed survey 
forms have not survived and so this additional information has been lost.5 Finally, 
5 We tracked down copies of the original survey instrument which are now stored in Record Group 
(RG) 257 in the US National Archives (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 1890–1905). The forms asked for 
additional information that was not published, such as the name and location of the establishment, and 
the names of the workers employed in the production of the various articles. 
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Figure 1 
Slope Chart Linking Hand to Machine Tasks for Unit 71
Source: Authors.
Note: Figure 1 relates each of the various hand tasks for shoe-making on the left to the (far more 
numerous) machine tasks for shoe-making on the right. Tasks are numbered in sequence. Some hand 
tasks link to multiple machine tasks. Some are performed in quite different sequences between hand and 
machine production—these lines cross over. A few hand tasks like “selecting and sorting stock” vanish 
in machine production (we have connected these to “Task 0” in machine production on the right-hand 
side). Moreover, the white space on the right-hand axis to which no hand production tasks connect 
represent new tasks created by mechanization for which there was no hand production analog.
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as previously noted, the study reported the labor requirements for a standardized 
scale of production, which enhances comparability. But the number of workers 
employed and the organization of work may not reflect how producers, especially 
hand producers, would have operated at that specific scale under realistic time-cost 
considerations.
Task Transitions and the Role of Steam Power 
We focus on three broad features of the Hand and Machine Labor data: transi-
tions of tasks from hand to machine labor; the overall productivity gains associated 
with machine labor; and the impact of steam power on productivity in machine 
production for the subset of tasks that were common to both hand and machine 
labor (tasks in the 1:1 transition category as discussed below). 
Task Transitions: From Hand to Machine Production
The data from the Hand and Machine Labor study allow us to see the transition 
from hand to machine labor at the task level. The agents collecting the data listed 
tasks in production order under both hand and machine manufacture, adding a 
column linking hand to machine tasks. This allows us to draw a slope chart as in 
Figure 1 and to distinguish six types of transitions from hand to machine tasks:
 a)  Hand tasks that were no longer performed under machine labor, or old 
tasks, which we label as 1:0 transitions;
 b) Tasks whose content was deemed to be essentially the same in hand and 
machine production, except that the machine task might be mechanized, 
which we label as 1:1 transitions; 
 c) A single hand task that was subdivided into M machine tasks, which we label 
as 1:M transitions;
 d) N hand tasks that were combined into a single machine task, which we label 
as N:1 transitions; 
 e) N hand tasks were mapped into M machine tasks, with both N and M greater 
than one, which we label as N:M transitions; and, lastly, 
 f) Tasks present under machine production but not hand production, or “new” 
tasks, which we label as 0:1 transitions.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on each different kind of task transition 
across production units in the study. Table 1A presents these statistics from the 
point of view of the origin, hand labor, and Table 1B from the point of view of the 
destination, machine labor. Instead of counts of transitions, we focus on the share 
of tasks for each type of transition. We normalize within production units either by 
the total number of tasks (equal weights) or by weighting each task by its share of 
total production time (time weights); in either case, our estimates of average shares 
are equally weighted across units. Both panels also show the proportion of tasks that 
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were mechanized, whether by steam or water, similarly weighted. The sample used 
to compute Table 1 covers 610 of the original 626 manufacturing units.6 For the 
most part, our discussion of Table 1 focuses on the equally weighted (rather than 
the time-weighted) statistics in Table 1.
Although some hand tasks were abandoned in the transition to machine labor, 
these comprised a small share of hand tasks and of the time spent in hand labor. 
The largest category of transitions by far was 1:1—that is, the agents were able to 
match a singleton task in hand production with a singleton task in machine produc-
tion whose content was deemed to be the same, except that in machine production 
of the product, the task was far more likely to be mechanized. As can be seen from 
6 We excluded units from foreign countries, those that used horses, and which were otherwise missing 
data necessary for our analyses.
Table 1 
Tasks Transitions, Hand to Machine Labor
Transition
Share of tasks,  
equal weights
Share of tasks, 
time weights
Share using 
steam power, 
equal weights
Share using 
water power, 
equal weights
Share using 
steam power, 
time weights
Share using 
water power, 
time weights
A: Hand Labor
1:0 0.044 0.030 0.003 0.002 0.002 < 0.001
1:1 0.673 0.604 0.014 0.017 0.009 0.020
1:M 0.134 0.192 0.023 0.005 0.008 0.006
N:M, N > 1, M > 1 0.040 0.054 < 0.001 0.010 < 0.001 0.003
N:1 0.108 0.121 0.010 0.018 0.031 0.019
Total 1.000 1.000 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.016
B: Machine Labor
1:1 0.458 0.563 0.436 0.029 0.461 0.033
1:M 0.146 0.172 0.558 0.058 0.538 0.068
N:M, N>1, M>1 0.024 0.038 0.593 0.070 0.518 0.068
N:1 0.037 0.070 0.757 0.051 0.764 0.060
0:1 0.334 0.158 0.360 0.014 0.333 0.020
Total 1.000 1.000 0.444 0.034 0.477 0.040
Source: Computed from a digitized version of the Hand and Machine Labor study, see text and US 
Department of Labor (1899).
Notes: The unit of observation is a task as described by the staff of the Hand and Machine Labor study. 
The basic sample size in Panel A is 7,152 hand tasks from 610 production units. The basic sample size 
in Panel B is 12,473 machine labor tasks from 610 production units. 1:0 transitions are the hand labor 
tasks that disappeared in the transition to machine labor. 1:1 transitions are hand labor tasks that have a 
unique counterpart in machine production. In a 1:M transition, a single hand labor task subdivides into 
M machine tasks. In an N:M transition, N hand labor tasks transition into M machine labor tasks, with 
N > 1 and M > 1. In an N:1 transition N hand tasks combine to a single machine task. 0:1 indicates new 
tasks under machine labor. For equal weights, observations count equally in determining the average task 
shares within units. For time weights, observations are weighted by completion time in determining the 
average task shares within units. 
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Table 1B, about 46.5 percent of 1:1 tasks in machine production used inanimate 
power; of these, 94 percent (0.436/0.465) were steam-powered.
As examples of mechanization in 1:1 transitions, consider the relatively large 
number of tasks involving trimming excess leather at various stages (for example, 
operations 33, 117, 133, and 135) or “skiving” leather where it overlapped to 
reducing bulk (operations 17–21, 54, 63, 71, 82, 88–93, and 135) in the produc-
tion of boots and shoes, such as in Unit 71. Many patents were issued for tools 
and machines to facilitate these activities (see, for example, patents issued for 
leather trimming and skiving prior to 1874 (US Patent Office 1874). Under hand 
production, these activities were accomplished with a sharp (sometimes special-
ized) knife, guided by hand and eye. Under machine production, however, the 
knives were built into powered machines (for example, see US Patent 609868A 
granted 1898; also see the YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jv-
nE1ixiB0 for the mechanics of a belt-driven skiving machine that is more or 
less contemporaneous with the Hand and Machine Labor study). These oper-
ated at high speed, allowing little chance of recovery if the product was wrongly 
placed, and with considerable risk to the operator. The operation of the trimming 
machine (and trimmer), for example, is described as follows (in Goldmark 1912, 
p. 65): 
[It] consists of a sharp knife edge, operating constantly against a sharp edged 
revolving top. The man who works the machine stands, holding upside down 
somewhat below the level of his eyes, the partly made, still unsoled shoe. He 
turns it skillfully and rapidly on the revolving top, against whose sharp edge 
the second knife-blade operates, cutting off all the surplus crimpled leather. 
The work is extremely rapid and absolutely uniform. But it takes skill and 
close attention. The machine could easily cut off too much, or could cut into 
the upper, if the swift handling of the shoe were not absolutely correct. 
The more complex transitions that involved subdividing hand tasks (1:M) 
or consolidating (N:1) them (or possibly both (N:M)), were less common but by 
no means unusual. Keeping with the example of producing medium grade, laced 
shoes (Unit 71), machine production subdivided the selection of stock into several 
tasks (1, 23, and 35) because the various parts of a pair of shoes no longer came 
from a single hide as they would for hand-made shoes. Selecting various parts by 
look and feel so that the pattern and texture of the leather was similar improved 
the appearance of the finished product, making machine-made shoes look more 
like their hand-made counterparts. Mechanization, however, sometimes led to the 
consolidation of separate tasks. For example, the development of a super heavy-
duty sewing machine (such as patent US 502873, granted to J. E. Bertrand in 
1893) allowed the outsoles to be attached to the welts directly while locking the 
shoe shank in place. This reduced what had been two separate tasks (124a and 
124b) in handicraft production (where the shoemaker used two variations on a 
single tool—an awl, round for locking the shank in place and square to attach 
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the outsole) to a single machine operation (that is, a N:1 transition, or consolida-
tion). From the perspective of hand labor, about 28 percent of hand tasks, on 
average, fell into the 1:M, N:M, or N:1 transitions; the corresponding figure from 
the perspective of machine labor was smaller, about 21 percent. As Panel B shows, 
the more complex transitions, especially consolidations, were also more likely to 
be mechanized by steam.
An important finding in Panel B is that new tasks were one-third of all tasks 
in machine labor, a much higher fraction than the share of hand labor tasks that 
were abandoned. Compared with the other tasks performed by machine labor, 
these new tasks were considerably less likely to use steam power, although the 
overall rate of steam use in new tasks, about 36 percent, was still substantial in 
an absolute sense. Many of these tasks were themselves directly related to that 
power source: engineers and firemen, for example, represented 15 percent of 
these new tasks. However, the more important group of new nonpowered tasks 
in machine production were those related to monitoring of the workplace activi-
ties (for example, the task of foreman/supervisor) and inspection of the finished 
product (for example, inspector, examiner, packer, and finisher). These activities 
made up about 20 percent of the 0:1 tasks and were essential to the smooth flow 
of the production line and the quality of the final product given that no single 
worker or group thereof assumed responsibility for the outcome of the production 
process. 
The relative importance of new tasks declines when the data are weighted by 
time, indicating that many of the new tasks were relatively brief in duration. Even 
allowing for this, however, new tasks performed by machine labor accounted for a 
larger share of total production time than the share of time accounted for by old 
tasks in hand labor. We return to this point later in the paper when we consider our 
findings in light of Acemoglu and Restrepo’s (2018) model of automation.
Although we have focused on task shares in Table 1, it is important to 
acknowledge that the absolute number of tasks increased from hand to machine 
labor. This increase is a direct manifestation of the increased division of labor 
that accompanied mechanization. As we described in detail in Atack, Margo, and 
Rhode (2017), it is possible to use the information in the Hand and Machine 
Labor study to compute a summary statistic of the division of labor—specifi-
cally, the proportion of tasks performed by the average worker. Multiplying by 
the number of tasks transforms the statistic into the average number of tasks per 
worker. The median number of tasks per worker in hand production was two, 
whereas in machine production, it was just one. In other words, the division of 
labor in machine production was virtually complete—if the HML study delineated 
a task, one or more workers were assigned to it and, on average, that was pretty 
much all they did, as far as the production of the specific good was concerned. As 
Marshall and Marshall (1881, p. 49) would note, “when the division of [labor] is 
carried very far a man’s whole attention is concentrated on one operation …[and] 
such operations are performed … with a rapidity and an unerring accuracy …” We 
return to the division of labor below. 
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The Productivity Effects of Machine Labor and the Role of Steam Power 
The standard way to measure labor productivity is by the flow of output over 
some period of time (for example, annually) divided by total labor hours over the 
same period. The Hand and Machine Labor study did not do this. Rather, for a stan-
dardized quantity of the specific good, the HML staff computed the amount of time 
each task took and then summed to get the total amount of time. Because a specific 
good is held constant (insofar as this is ever possible) while looking at hand and 
machine production, as is the standardized quantity, the overall productivity gain is 
simply the difference in total time between machine and hand labor. Given that the 
range of products considered were so very different, we do not compute the produc-
tivity gain in absolute units of time (say, hours) but rather calculate the logarithm 
of the ratio of machine to labor time, which is then averaged (equally weighted) 
across units. This average is -1.96. If we take the exponent, it is 0.14 [e–1.96]—that 
is, on average, machine labor reduced total production time by a factor of seven 
(≈ 1/.14).
What accounts for these remarkable gains in productivity? In Atack, Margo, 
and Rhode (2017), we concentrated on the role of division of labor (to which we 
return in the discussion below). In this paper, we shift our attention to mechaniza-
tion—that is, the use of an inanimate power source, in particular, steam power.
Economic historians have long had a keen interest in the diffusion of the steam 
engine and its attendant microeconomic and aggregate effects. These include 
the geography of steam adoption, changes in relative power costs in the face of 
technological innovation, externalities of steam power such as its role in fostering 
urbanization, and its impact on aggregate total factor productivity growth (Atack 
1979; Atack, Bateman, and Weiss 1980; Kim 2005; Temin 1966). More recently, 
there have also been studies of how mechanization, whether steam power or electri-
fication, affected the relative demand for different occupations (de Pleijt, Nuvolari, 
and Weisdorf 2018; Franck and Galor 2017; Gray 2013; Ojala, Pehkonen, and 
Eloranta 2016). By comparison, the Hand and Machine Labor study allows us to 
narrow the focus down to the task level for highly specific goods, comparing hand 
to machine production. This is straightforward to accomplish for the 1:1 overlap 
tasks; for these, we can difference the data at the task level within production units. 
Table 2 reports our productivity regressions. Recall that “productivity” in the 
Hand and Machine Labor study is measured by the amount of time that it takes to 
complete a particular task in sequence in the making of a given amount of a specific 
good. If it is possible to change something to complete the given task more quickly 
than before—for example, use inanimate power—productivity has increased. We 
derive the regression specification from the following equation:
ln T(i, j, k) = α(i, k) + β (  j, k) + γ × (Steam = 1|i, j, k) + δ × (Water = 1|i, j, k) + ε(i, j, k)
The index i refers to the task; the index j, to the type of labor ( j = hand or machine); 
and the index k, to the specific product or equivalently, what the HMLS staff called 
the “unit.” Ln T(i, j, k) is the log of the amount of time that it takes to complete task 
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i for labor type j in unit k; the greater is T, the longer it took to complete the given 
task. The parameter α is a task–unit fixed effect; that is, it is indexed for task i and 
unit k but not for labor type j. In making α dependent on i and k but not j, we are 
assuming that, while some tasks might take proportionately longer than others for 
a given product, these relative differences are the same under both machine and 
hand labor. The parameter β is a labor type–unit fixed effect; it is indexed by j and k 
but not by i. This allows for the possibility that machine labor was more productive 
in general and that the productivity gain differed across specific products. Our main 
interest is in the parameters γ and δ, which are the log effects of steam and water 
power use and which we assume have the same values under machine and hand 
labor. If steam or water power use proportionately reduces the amount of time to 
complete a task, then γ < 0 and δ < 0. 
To estimate this regression, we difference between machine and hand labor 
within units for all variables measured at the task level. We can do this directly 
because for every 1:1 task under machine labor there is an exact match to a coun-
terpart task under hand labor. After differencing, we have:
 ∆ ln T = ∆β + γ × ∆ (Steam = 1) + δ × ∆ (Water = 1) + ∆ ε
For ease of reading, we suppress the indexes but keep in mind that the unit 
of observation is the task. The dependent variable is the difference between 
machine and hand labor in the log of the amount of time it took to complete a task, 
Table 2 
The Productivity Effects of Steam and Water Power Use in 
Machine versus Hand Production: 1:1 Task Transitions
Dependent variable
Independent  
variable
ln (Time spent in machine task) – 
ln (Time spent in hand task)
(1)
ln (Time spent in machine task) − 
ln (Time spent in hand task)
(2)
ln (Time spent in  
 hand task)
−0.36
(12.29)
∆ (Steam = 1) −1.13
(19.29)
−0.84
(15.67)
∆ (Water = 1) −0.35
(2.86)
−0.28
(2.42)
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.61
Source: Authors.
Note: The sample consists of tasks in the 1:1 transition category for which there 
was complete information on the regression variables (N = 4,257). The dependent 
variable is the difference between machine and hand labor in the log of the amount 
of time that it took to complete the task. The mean value of the dependent variable 
is −1.74. See the text for the derivation of the regression equation. Both regressions 
in the table include unit fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the unit level.
Absolute value of t-statistics shown in parentheses.
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(∆ln T). The right-hand side variables are product fixed effects (∆β), the differ-
ences in the steam and water power dummies between machine and hand labor 
at the task level, and the difference in the error terms (∆ε). The mean value of 
the dependent variable is –1.74. If we take the exponent of this mean value, it is 
0.18 [= exp (–1.74)] or approximately 18 percent. That is, on average in the set of 
1:1 transitions, a task under machine labor took 18 percent of the time to complete 
as the counterpart task under hand labor, indicating that labor was much more 
productive in completing the machine task than the equivalent hand task. Note that 
this mean value, –1.74, is smaller in absolute value than the analogous difference 
overall between hand and machine labor, -1.96, implying that the more complex 
transitions in Table 1 were, in an accounting sense, more important in generating 
overall productivity gains than were the 1:1 transitions.
As shown in column 1 of Table 2, the estimates of γ and δ are negative and 
highly significant, indicating the use of steam or water is associated with a reduction 
in time to complete a task. Relative to the mean value of the dependent variable 
(–1.74), the magnitude of the steam power coefficient (–1.13) in column 1 is quite 
large, suggesting a very large impact of steam use. By contrast, the coefficient for 
water (–0.35) is much smaller, although still statistically significant. The impact of 
water was more modest than steam, probably because of water’s seasonality and 
storage constraints that limited its sustained flow. 
Of course we cannot claim that these coefficients are causal; in particular, there 
may be omitted variables that are correlated with ∆ Steam or ∆ Water. One way to 
explore this possibility is to include the log of the amount of time the task took 
under hand labor as a right-hand side variable, as shown in column 2 of Table 2. 
If use of steam or water became more likely in machine labor for tasks for which 
hand labor was particularly unskillful (which we cannot observe directly), we would 
expect the absolute values of the steam and water power coefficients to be smaller 
in column 2 than in column 1. While this is the case, the coefficients of steam and 
water power use remain quite large and highly significant, suggesting that inan-
imate power use was, indeed, a major factor contributing to higher productivity 
under machine labor.
Discussion
We discuss our results in light of the recent paper by Daron Acemoglu and 
Pascual Restrepo (2018, and see also their paper in this symposium), which provides 
a formal task-based model for analyzing the effects of automation. In Acemoglu and 
Restrepo’s model, tasks are ordered on a continuum along the unit interval from 
N – 1 to N  in terms of the productivity of labor relative to capital. At date t = 0, 
capital costs are assumed to be lower than labor costs. Some tasks can be performed 
by either capital or labor, so if capital is sufficiently cheap, these will already be 
“automated” at date t = 0. However, other tasks might still be performed just by 
labor, simply because the technology is not sufficiently advanced for automation to 
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occur. An improvement in technology, then, will induce additional automation to 
the new level of technical feasibility in the unit interval, or to the point where the 
firm is indifferent, on cost grounds, between capital and labor.  
Their model also allows for new tasks to be created that are superior to existing 
tasks. The process by which this occurs is independent from changes in automa-
tion. The assumptions in the model ensure that new tasks will appear at N *, the 
new right endpoint of the unit interval, while abandoned tasks will come from the 
former left endpoint, up to N * – 1. The entire unit interval, therefore, moves to the 
right.
The key implications of the Acemoglu and Restrepo framework concern the 
net impacts of automation and new task creation on labor demand. If automation 
occurs, there is a displacement effect—capital replaces labor in some tasks below 
the threshold. There is also a productivity effect. If overall output increases suffi-
ciently, demand for labor in non-automated tasks will increase on net. If, on net, 
new tasks use more labor, labor demand will further increase. However, if new tasks 
use less labor compared with abandoned tasks, the net impact of task replacement 
is negative, reducing any positive net effect that automation might have otherwise 
through productivity gains. 
We cannot use the Hand and Machine Labor data to “test” the Acemoglu 
and Restrepo model literally for three reasons. First, their model orders tasks in 
terms of labor’s comparative advantage at performing them. This is not the same 
as the order that tasks are actually performed in production. Second, we cannot 
re-order the HML tasks in terms of labor’s comparative advantage because this is 
not observed in the HML data. Third, tasks in the Acemoglu and Restrepo model 
are on a continuum, whereas the task descriptions in the HML study are written 
summaries of discrete activities—in effect, subsets of the tasks in the unit interval 
of tasks in the Acemoglu and Restrepo model. Even if the HML staff had somehow 
channeled the logic of an economic model from 125-odd years into the future and 
managed to collect information on labor’s comparative advantage, this would refer 
to the discrete activity, not to points (tasks) on a unit interval. 
Nevertheless, the Acemoglu and Restrepo model is still highly valuable as an 
interpretive framework. First, their displacement effect is obviously present in the 
Hand and Machine Labor data; inanimately powered machines did things that were 
previously done by hand using simple tools. In some cases, the machine task was a 
sped-up version of what hand labor did—a machine-powered sander or polisher, 
for example. But as shown by the N:1 transitions, multiple hand tasks were also 
consolidated into a single machine task, a complicated transition that cannot simply 
be described as a faster version of a single hand labor activity. As Marshall (1890, 
p. 112) observed in his Principles: “[M]achinery constantly supplants and renders 
unnecessary that purely manual skill, the attainment of which was, even up to Adam 
Smith’s time, the chief advantage of division of [labor]. But this influence is more 
than countervailed by its tendency to increase the scale of manufactures and to 
make them more complex; and therefore to increase the opportunities for divi-
sion of [labor] of all kinds.” Moreover, the displacement effect must have been 
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largest for the N:1 transitions, because the N hand tasks took nearly twice as long 
to complete (as a share of total time) than one machine task, a far larger amount 
of “labor-saving” than is evident in the other transitions. The N:1 transitions, as we 
noted earlier, were the most mechanized—the share of machine tasks using steam 
or water power—of all the transitions from hand to machine production. 
Second, the productivity effect was enormous. While detailed data are lacking, 
there is little doubt the average annual hours of operation per establishment in 
manufacturing increased over the nineteenth century (Atack and Bateman 1992; 
Whaples 1990). Yet, as the Hand and Machine Labor study shows, the amount of 
time it took machine labor to complete a product was a mere fraction of the time 
it took machine labor. On an average annual basis, therefore, the increase in total 
output was an order of magnitude larger than the displacement effect per unit of 
output, implying a very large positive impact on labor demand. 
Third, the net effect of the introduction of new tasks on labor demand appears 
to have been positive. This is because the share of time taken up by new tasks in 
machine labor was larger than the share of time associated with hand tasks that 
were abandoned—indeed, five times larger. Among other activities, these new tasks 
included maintenance of steam engines, a foreman supervising large numbers of 
workers (discussed further below), and workers packaging products for distant 
markets.
The upshot is that the transition from hand to machine labor led to a vast 
expansion in the size of the manufacturing labor force, both in absolute number 
and as a proportion of the national aggregate. This was because, not in spite, of an 
equally vast increase in productivity, such that by the end of the nineteenth century, 
output per worker in US manufacturing was twice the level in Britain or Germany 
(Broadberry 1998). As we have noted, a long literature in economic history and 
economics asserts that the diffusion of steam power was a major factor behind the 
increase in productivity, but never, until the regression analysis in this paper, has this 
been demonstrated for individual production tasks.
However, our analysis also shows that steam power was not the full story. In 
our earlier paper, Atack, Margo, and Rhode (2017), we studied the overall differ-
ence in productivity between machine and hand labor at the unit-level, rather than 
task-level. Because we were analyzing differences across units rather than across 
tasks within units, we could include measures of the overall division of labor in 
the relevant regressions. We found that direct measures of the division of labor—
specifically, the fraction of total tasks performed by the average worker and the 
number of tasks—fully account for the positive effects of overall scale, as measured 
by the number of workers. Unlike the regressions in Table 2 of this paper, those in 
our earlier paper do not control directly for steam (or water) power, but instead 
have a dummy variable for hand production. The coefficient of this dummy vari-
able is positive and significant, implying that, once we control for the division of 
labor, other factors associated with machine labor compared with hand labor, such 
as greater use of steam power, contributed to overall productivity gains. Our results 
in Table 2 here are fully consistent with this interpretation.
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The point we wish to make here is that, as useful as it is as an overall framing 
device, the Acemoglu and Restrepo model omits a fundamental feature of histor-
ical industrialization—namely, its extensive division of labor. As far as that model is 
concerned, the individual workers who perform tasks before and after automation 
could be the same people. 
In point of fact, however, they were not the same people. In the tiniest shops 
that are iconic depictions of hand production in early manufacturing, the artisan 
was highly skilled in the sense of performing most or all of the production tasks 
from start to finish, as well as “nonproduction” tasks associated with managing the 
business. In the transition to machine labor, the artisan shop was displaced by the 
factory, which was different in many ways that could perhaps be summarized as 
“more” of everything—more capital, more labor, and more output. Establishments 
grew in size and complexity, an evolution that spawned the rise of a white collar 
labor force to oversee it—a “visible hand” in Alfred Chandler’s (1977) memorable 
phase.
Our concern here is not so much the rise of the modern corporation a la Chan-
dler, but rather what labor historians call “deskilling.” Examples of deskilling are 
everywhere to be found in the data from the Hand and Machine Labor study. We 
have already cited the example of shoemaking; another example is blacksmithing—
previously, this involved making rakes (Unit 30), most of the assorted carriage and 
wagon products (units 140–185), tools, and various other metal goods. The “village 
smithy,” fashioning metal objects like pots, pans, plows, and numerous other 
objects from iron, could be found in small towns and in the countryside all over 
the United States as late as 1850. Atack and Margo (2019) use census data to study 
the relative decline of blacksmithing as a “hand trade” over the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Machine production led to establishments specializing in, for 
example, agricultural implements. These establishments were much larger in terms 
of employment than blacksmith shops, and far more productive in making plows, 
rakes and hoes, and related tools. Faced with such competition, blacksmith shops 
either shifted away from making objects to fixing them by offering repair services, 
or simply disappeared. The job of blacksmithing was once considered sufficiently 
numerous to warrant its own industry classification, but by the very end of the nine-
teenth century it was dropped from the manufacturing census as no longer worth 
the trouble to enumerate.
The point we are emphasizing, however, is not deskilling per se, but rather that 
the extent to which individual workers might be specialized in allocating their labor 
across tasks has important implications. The massive division of labor documented 
front and center in the Hand and Machine Labor study dramatically affected the 
nature of the human capital investment decision facing successive cohorts of Amer-
ican workers contemplating whether to enter the manufacturing sector. Earlier in 
the nineteenth century, the human capital investment problem such workers faced 
was mastering the diverse set of skills associated with most or all of the tasks involved 
in making a product, along with managing the affairs of a (very) small business, 
an artisan shop. The human capital investment problem facing the prospective 
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manufacturing worker in the 1890s was quite different. There was little or no need 
to learn how to fashion a product from start to finish; mastery of one or two tasks 
would do, and such mastery might be gained quickly on the job. The more able or 
ambitious might gravitate to learning new skills, such as designing, maintaining, or 
repairing steam engines, or clerical/managerial tasks, the demand for which had 
grown sharply as average establishment size increased over the century (Katz and 
Margo 2014). 
For many decades in the twentieth century, specialization was economically 
beneficial to workers—the costs of learning skills were relatively modest and the 
return on the investment—a relatively secure, highly paid job in manufacturing—
made that investment worthwhile. The prospect of widespread automation has 
arguably changed this calculus. No single “job” is safe and the optimal investment 
strategy may be very different—a suite of diverse, relatively uncorrelated skills as 
insurance against displacement by robotics and artificial intelligence. This is perhaps 
the sense in which the history of how technology affects jobs is not repeating itself, 
and “this time” really is different.
Concluding Remarks
To understand the effects of automation on jobs, a number of labor econo-
mists have turned away from traditional “black box” models of production and 
their assumptions of relative complementarity or substitutability between capital 
and different types of labor. Instead, production is modeled as a collection of tasks, 
some of which might be performed by labor or automated with capital. Empir-
ical assessments of these models have generally been indirect, in part because 
the data demands are so formidable. Even in today’s world awash in “big data,” 
information on production is rarely recorded at the task level. In the absence 
of such data, analysts must infer the task content of jobs indirectly through 
the use of, for example, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (US Employment 
Service 1991).
This paper has reported on some preliminary but ongoing analyses of the US 
Department of Labor’s Hand and Machine Labor (US Department of Labor 1899) 
study. The study has been long known by economic historians—but almost never 
used because the data were, until recent advances in information technologies, 
too complex to analyze. Our analysis of the HML data confirms the modern view 
that the “machine age” was transformative. It also reveals, however, that current 
task-based models of automation need elaboration to take into account certain 
effects of mechanization on labor that were historically relevant, like the division 
of labor. 
The modern debate over automation and labor frequently invokes historical 
antecedents, most notably the steam engine during the early industrialization. 
Typically, historical evidence serves as anecdote to provide a context against 
which qualitative predictions can be made. For example, the steam engine was 
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revolutionary in its time, and in retrospect it is clear that it “destroyed” some jobs 
but created many others. However, the extent to which the disruptive effects of the 
mechanization of the past serves as a prologue to the technologies of the present or 
future, or whether the modern technologies of robotics and artificial intelligence 
are fundamentally different in some way, remains an open question. It is intriguing 
to imagine how artificial intelligence might reduce the cost of reassigning and reor-
ganizing tasks, allowing for more efficient dynamic optimization of production 
in response to changing conditions. Models that allow for such shifts of tasks and 
alterations in the division of labor may pay a useful role in understanding the tech-
nological shifts to come. 
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